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Abstract
The centuries-long practice of the teaching turned mechanics into an academic construct detached
from its underlying science, the physics of macroscopic bodies. In particular, the regularities that
delineate the scope of validity of Newtonian mechanics was never used as premises in that construct.
Instead, its logical structure has been built with the only purpose to ease the presentation of
mechanics as an application of calculus and algebra. This leaves no room for the explicit physical
description of the fundamental notions of the construct, such as the ability of (a system of) physical
bodies to keep a spatial form, symbolized by a rigid measuring rod, and the possibility to count out
even temporal intervals, symbolized by a standard clock, let alone the origin of the basic mechanical
quantities.
The comparison between (states of) physical objects is possible as far as the natural regular-
ities enable a researcher to define an equivalence relation in a set of these objects. The class of
macroscopic (or macroscopically perceived) objects is that one where certain composition rules
hold so that constituents of any object are macroscopic, too. Then the properties of compositions
of macroscopic objects, being in conjunction with the equivalence relations between them, yield a
numerical characterization of each macroscopic object, i.e. a basic physical quantity. The technique
of logically arranged feasible/thought experiments is used to formulate the logically impeccable,
induction-based definitions for two quantities: the length of a line segment as an instructive toy
example and the mass of a macroscopic body as an example applicable to the real world.
Keywords: physical quantities, physics education, foundations of mechanics, length, mass
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I. IS PHYSICS AS FOUNDATIONLESS AS IT IS PRESENTED?
It is commonplace for standard physics courses to introduce the basic physical quanti-
ties, such as length, time, mass, charge, force, temperature, in a fairly artless, not to say
misleading, manner. Effectively, they provide students with nothing but a bare reference
to the symbols of the mathematical variables that can derive their ultimate theoretical and
experimental meaning from the topics covered later on in the curriculum. Obviously, this
instigates a student to begin learning physics with rote learning since ordinarily we expect
symbols to refer to things or events or ideas, but not the reverse. An educated person, such
as a teacher, perceives this organization of the learning material as logically circular; it com-
pletely neglects those subtle and careful considerations that the scientists of the past had to
address when developing the basic concepts gradually.1 This can easily make inexperienced
teachers feel involved in expounding a foundationless and thereby questionable science.
The practice of teaching impels authors of textbooks, especially those of the high school
level, to moderate and to disguise the apparently awkward, upside-down logic of the in-
troductory chapters. Usually they try to appeal to students’ everyday experience, such as
perception of muscular effort in exemplifying the concept of the force as a push or a pull,
sense of hot and cold in presenting the idea of the temperature as a degree of warmth, vague
reminiscences of the obsolete meanings of the mass as a quantity of matter and the charge
as a quantity of electricity. But eventually, remarks of this kind either give way to common
misconceptions and make the long-term distraction from the precise meaning of the physics
terms or, at best, result in a waste of time because no correct logical inference or calculation
uses them actually. Quite aware of this, most of the authors of university level texts have
opted to restrict each such initial remark to a one-sentence opening statement and to start
the algebra and calculus based presentation of physical laws as early as possible. However,
without the essential and well-founded definitions of physical quantities,2 any formulas re-
main largely meaningless until the students set about working through examples and thereby
get access to the experimentally verifiable information such as the non-numerical but un-
ambiguous description of situations where a given formulation of a given law is applicable.
In the next section, the reader will have a chance to appreciate anew how incredibly long,
inevitably vague, and eventually useless the chain of those ”introductory” statements can
be, with which the authors of modern textbooks feel obliged to precede the analysis of the
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more or less true physical examples.
II. IS SCIENCE PERPLEXINGLY SIMPLE OR SIMPLY PERPLEXING?
Although the perfunctory presentation of the primary theoretical concepts in standard
textbooks may seem sufficient to start making students acquainted with the collection of
formulas prerequisite to training in engineering disciplines, it is obviously far from expound-
ing physics as a science. Moreover, attempts to adhere to the logical sequence within the
approach sketched in the previous section could even discredit the scientific method because
they would formally entail the ludicrous necessity to involve complicated and hazy notions
in order to interpret simple and clear ones. The following is an example illustrating this
point.
Evidently, the regular use of kitchen/bathroom/luggage scales allows observant people to
get the idea how some of their readings are related, without any theoretical reasoning. In
fact, it is elementary school science lessons that are supposed to help virtually all students
gain this kind of experience. One class of such relations expresses the result
W [a ∪ b] = W [a] +W [b] (1)
of weighing two body a and b simultaneously in one scalepan via those of weighing them
separately. If, additionally, one takes into account the measurement procedures, one can
further make a distinction between Eq. (1) and a similar property of bodies themselves,
m[a ∪ b] = m[a] +m[b], (2)
produced by weighing with the aid of a beam balance and commonly referred to as the
additivity of mass. Note that the form of Eq. (1) or Eq. (2) reveals the exact meaning
of the word ”quantity” while the actual physical operations denoted by the symbols ”∪”
and ”+” specify what sort of quantity we are dealing with. (Those who still can’t tell
much difference between a mathematical number and a quantity of something might find it
enlightening to look at the appendix A.)
Over centuries, the facts expressed by Eq. (2) motivated students to adopt ”a quantity
of matter” as a definition of mass willingly, assuming that ”matter” is an indestructible
ponderable entity able to occupy space as well as actually or potentially divisible. Aside
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from this extraneously speculative and unnecessarily generalizing conception, the physical
regularities backing up Eq. (2) enable the practical standards of mass known as prototypes
and still being in effect.
Similarly, Eq. (1) exposes the weight W as another quantity. It allowed teachers of the
past to use the weight as an easily produced and readily available exemplar of the force
and then to unfold statics consistently, without invoking Newton’s second law of motion
prematurely.4
By contrast, the modern physics education does not provide students with an orderly
scientific description of what they can gradually learn about nature. Had today’s learner
been resolute enough to extract it as completely as possible from the common modern
textbooks how physics treats his/her plain experience of weighing, he/she would have to
work hard in order to finally build something like the following long sequence of statements:
1. The position of a body assumed as a material point is (represented by) a vector whose
components in a reference frame aka a coordinate system are the Cartesian coordinates
of the body.8 Coordinates are assumed to be numbers resulting from the measurement
with the aid of a meterstick (a measuring rod) or a measuring tape.9
2. The positions of a bodies may change in the course of time. The time interval is
measured by properly synchronized clocks in an inertial reference frame.10
3. The velocity of a body is the first derivative of its position vector with respect to time;
the acceleration a of a body is the first derivative of its velocity with respect to time.11
4. The cause of the acceleration of one body is an action of other bodies. The standard
action/force aka the unit of force is an effort (a push or a pull) producing a standard
acceleration of a standard body.12 Then the force of a given action is supposed to be
a number of the standard ones in the same direction and together making the given
action.
5. Any push or pull action has its own characteristics: The masses of two point bod-
ies and the relative position vector of one body with respect to another determine
the universal gravitation between them uniquely; the similar statement holds for the
electrical interaction of two point electric charges; a specific compression of a spring
dictates its stress etc. So, in principle, we can make an alternative choice of a standard
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force by singling out one with some specified characteristics, for example, the tension
in a certain piece of rubber stretched to a certain extent.13 The spring scale calibrated
against the weight of a standard body can be used to measure other kinds of forces.14
6. Experiments show that several forces simultaneously acting on a body combine to
make a net force in accordance with the vector addition rule.15
7. An inertial reference frame is one where the inertia law aka Newton’s first law holds.16
In another formulation, this is a frame where Newton’s laws together stand.17
8. In an inertial reference frame, a net force F acting on a given body effects the body’s
acceleration a ∝ F so that the relation F/a depends on the body only and, for this
reason, is called the mass of the body.18 Then Eq. (2) appears consistent with the
application of Newton’s second law to a compound of two rigidly connected bodies.19
9. Alternatively, the relation of accelerations of interacting bodies can yield the relation
of their masses. Thus the adoption of a certain number as the mass of a standard
body results in assigning definite numbers to the masses of all bodies actually or
potentially.20 Employing this definition, one can experimentally verify that ”mass is a
scalar quantity and thus obeys the rules of ordinary arithmetic.”21
10. The weight W of a body of mass m equals the magnitude mg of the gravity force
where g is the magnitude of the acceleration of a body freely falling near the Earth’s
surface.22
Consider a university student versed enough to understand at least the formal relations
among the quantities mentioned in the above items. When asked to explain/interpret Eq.
(2) on the basis of physical laws, such a student would not find it difficult to see that, in
view of the simple chain of equalities,
m[a] · g +m[b] · g =W [a] +W [b] = W [a ∪ b] = m[a ∪ b] · g,
the items 10, 6 and 8 entail Eq. (2). Meanwhile, an experienced physicist would find
this reasoning at least insufficient and perhaps as physically pointless as, for instance, the
naive formal derivation of the inertia law from Newton’s second law applied to a free body.
(For another instance of the obvious but naive ”inference”, see the discussion after Eq. (6)
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in Section V.) This is because drawing conclusions about such basic quantities from the
general physical regularities requires a profound knowledge of their true meaning. But,
keeping in mind a supposedly elaborated and authoritative sequence like the items 1 - 10,
the beginner would hardly doubt his/her ”theory” about weighing even when he/she came
across isolated warnings such as ”this additive property of mass seems obvious but it has to
be verified experimentally.”23 The student would simply not make out such comments since
they dismiss his/her attempt to rely upon deduction, i.e. the idea that a conclusion is as
true as the premises and needs no separate testing.
In the next section, the reader will learn why the presentation of mechanics in today’s
textbooks has no choice but to tolerate the false introduction to the basics.
III. CAN SCIENCE BE LOGICAL?
The apparent disregard for the logic – the main tool of theoretical analysis – in the
warning quoted in the end of the previous section is only a tip of the iceberg: The sequence
1 - 10 makes no scientifically reasonable and logically ordered (basis for a) body of knowledge
about a particular field of physics but is the historically established way of introduction to the
set of the regularities known as Newtonian mechanics, by means of algebra and calculus.24
Further on in the essay this sequence is referred to as the academic construct of mechanics,
or AM in the abbreviated form.
If you acquaint students with the formalism of mechanics in order to start applying
algebra/calculus to a host of hopefully instructive examples/models as early as possible,
then it does not matter whether you stick to an overall consistent view or not. Some minor
but obvious departures from the logical order in the academic construct of mechanics are
just slightly annoying. For example, its items 4 and 5 imply that the addition operation
for forces has already been defined while in fact the item 6 of AM describes it later. This
is tolerable in a general/overview course prerequisite to major engineering subjects, when
a teacher focuses on solving idealized problems that symbolize feasible applications rather
than represent fundamentals of nature.
Meanwhile, students studying physics as a science, especially as a major subject, are
usually expected to be good at critical thinking and rational reasoning. So the subject
they take ought to be logically consistent at least. In this relation, the drawbacks of the
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academic construct of mechanics are too awkward to fix without restructuring the entire
presentation. If learners started questioning, for example, the traditional wording of the
inertia law, a teacher could not give them a logically correct explanation within the frame
of that construct.56 The following are the remarks about the most essential flaws in the
academic construct of mechanics.
One challenge for the presentation of physics theory comes from the continuous refine-
ment of mathematics education: It is not uncommon today for a university physics teacher
to deal with physics/mathematics majors with a strong mathematical background, who can
be interested in why physical quantities are real numbers, not rational or hyperreal ones,
or even elements of a non-commutative algebra. At first glance, it is only an introduction
to an operator formalism in a graduate/postgraduate course of quantum mechanics that
can provoke such questions. However, as soon as the learner understands that the concept
of numbers of a given sort is primarily defined by specifying the addition and multiplica-
tion operations with them, he/she can clearly comprehend what the additivity of mass or
the superposition of forces means and may guess that some physics should underlie the
addition/subtraction operation for any quantity. Then nothing can prevent such students
from questioning, for instance, even the mundane and seemingly unassailable item 3 of the
academic construct of mechanics, since the derivative involves subtraction and, therefore,
should imply some way to make it physically. (Readers with little experience in relation
of mathematical constructs such as addition/subtraction to their applications may find the
appendix A elucidative.)
One of the more subtle but apparent formal faults in the academic construct of mechanics
is that the definition of a time coordinate in the item 2 of AM employs the concept of an
inertial reference frame, which, in turn, refer to Newton’s laws in the item 7 of AM. It
reveals that in fact dynamics precedes kinematics logically, which is contrary to the usual
presentation order of the AM items 3 and 4.
The fundamental flaw that undermines the logic of the academic construct of mechanics
from the beginning is as follows: The item 1 of AM implies that coordinates and, there-
fore, a reference frame itself exist physically (i.e. can be characterized as measurable/ob-
servable/realizable/reproducible), only if it is possible to independently verify whether the
measuring rod is rigid and applied consistently with any other rigid objects. Similarly, the
measurement of the time intervals in the item 2 of AM presupposes that the clock ticks
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evenly or, equivalently, there is no slow uncontrolled variation in a standard frequency. In
principle, the conditions for existence of the spatial and temporal coordinates can be cou-
pled when one brings into play electromagnetic radiation, (recognized as) propagating at a
constant speed through the vacuum. But if one is wise enough to avoid muddling essentially
different phenomena in one’s theoretical analysis without a real need and to stay within the
mechanics of macroscopic bodies only, one will admit that ”rigid” should mean something
like ”stiff enough under typically applied loads.” This suggests that notions from statics do
take logical precedence over such geometrical concepts as Cartesian coordinates.
It is worth emphasizing that for the mechanics of macroscopic bodies and for celestial
mechanics the situation described reveals a badly formulated but still working theory. How-
ever, any mindless attempt to go further and to apply the same approach to the phenomena
at atomic or cosmological scales includes the risk of getting unusable mixture of true, false
and meaningless statements because, naturally, we cannot rely on solid rigid rod to interpret
the meaning of microscopic or cosmic distances.
In today’s education, even a physics major has little chance to get any clarifications on
the above and other issues related to the foundations of classical mechanics: Lecturers of
undergraduate courses feel it is their duty to consider the fundamentals in more detail28 but
never touch the origin of the conventional mathematical formulation in their disparate com-
ments. Leaders of graduate courses, especially those interested in foundations of mechanics,
may sometimes recognize the logical gaps in its formalism29 but do not expect them to affect
any practical applications. So a student can easily find several mathematical reformulations
of classical mechanics such as Lagrangian mechanics, useful for, e.g., computational robotics,
but never learns about the logical hierarchy of physical concepts. And for advanced post-
graduate courses, typically tailored to meet the immediate needs of research programs, it
seems almost impossible to pay attention to such scientifically ”old-fashioned” topic as the
basic mechanics of macroscopic bodies.
One result of such training is a researcher who has difficulty in formulating the logically
complete description of more or less directly perceivable macroscopical physics but is nev-
ertheless supposed to consciously apply more abstruse concepts of quantum mechanics and
general relativity to the phenomena on atomic and cosmological scales. It is not uncommon
when a young physicist, especially one engaged in teaching, feels as though, in science, there
is no firm ground to stand on. And as an instructor he/she usually see no option but to
8
maintain the vicious circle of obscuring the physical origin of the basic quantities for the
next generation of students.
In principle, a researcher is assumed capable of self-learning through the study and critical
analysis of the works of all previous scholars. But when he/she delves as deep as into the
foundations, this kind of his/her individual activity becomes highly time-consuming. So it
appears to be nothing but the initial training that generally determines the performance of
researchers in their most productive years. Then we have to recognize that, independently
of the amount of the government grants for research programs, only the efforts of teachers
in developing appropriate curricula maintain the overall quality of research. Although in
today’s society there seems to be no one interested in supporting such efforts as yet, we
should hope that teachers themselves feel obliged to form the consistent and well structured
body of knowledge before imparting it.
In the next section the reader will learn what it is in the good old science of the past that
can help teachers improve the logic of introductory physics courses.
IV. ARE GOOD IDEAS OF OLD-FASHIONED SCIENCE STILL BIDING ITS
TIME?
In the broad historical sense, the scientific activity is the attempts to alternate the fol-
lowing two processes:
linking: establishing new patterns in available observational/experimental/practical data
to improve/change/create ideas/hypotheses/theories/technologies;31
accumulating: utilizing available technologies/theories/hypotheses/ideas to obtain new
observational/experimental/practical data.
These processes differ by the type of inference used by researchers: induction is the leading
technique in the first process, while deduction is the main tool in the second one.
The considerations in the previous sections suggest that, as far as research activity is
concerned, the contemporary physics education does well in preparing physics students for
the process of accumulating while its little attention to the process of linking accounts for the
existing inconsistencies in the presentations of fundamentals. Meanwhile, many scientists
of the past gave us a good deal of reasoning that are well within that latter process. Even
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Newton, who started his Principia with ”definitions” and ”axioms, or laws of motion” in
apparent attempt to follow the deductive pattern of famous Euclid’s Elements, had recourse
to induction and could not but admit it in his Rule IV32 as a necessary part of reasoning
in science. Moreover, only induction can substantiate many of the assumptions on which
deductive lines of thought in physics often rely implicitly.
One of the relevant examples in Principia is the well known reasoning33 by which Newton
extends the scope of applicability of his third Law of motion to include long-range attractions
such as gravity or magnetism. Thanks to the studies of collisions of macroscopic bodies made
by previous authors, there had already been the notion of how action and counteraction of
contact repulsion (due to resistance of material) of the bodies relate. Newton took it for
granted that there could always be an obstacle that impedes contact between two mutually
attracting bodies while maintaining its state with respect to those bodies. He backed up his
idea by reference to an experiment with two magnets and to the apparent equilibrium of the
Earth as a self-gravitating body. This suggests that, if stated explicitly, the only reasonable
purpose (and the meaning) of Newton’s implicit premise would be to delineate the scope of
validity of the proposed theory by specifying a class of covered phenomena: the theory is
correct as far as there can be an obstacle described by Newton. In particular, it is from the
existence of such an auxiliary macroscopic body and from the appropriate empirical data
today’s physicist can infer, e.g., the lower boundary of the range of the spatial scales within
which Newtonian mechanics is applicable (see the appendix B).
This tacit reference to the experimental/observational data, i.e. use of induction, is
typical of such theoretical constructs, later named ”thought experiments” (for an overview,
see, e.g., 35 and the references therein.) It is the technique of thought experiments that
reseachers/teachers/engineers of the past can invoke to make a non-numeric yet accurate
description of a physical situation. Stevin’s ”principle of solidification”36 is a good example
of this in mechanics and mechanical engineering.
One of the things that are still important today is that some of such non-numeric state-
ments may remain valid in case the (continuous functions of) Cartesian coordinates of small
parts of a body do not exist within a desired accuracy due to, e.g., quantum phenomena at
sufficiently small scales. The impossibility of an isolated perpetual motion machine is the
most famous principle of this kind: While typically the textbooks tell the learners that this
assertion is equivalent to the law of conservation of energy, it in fact is true whether or not
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there is indeed the energy as a numerical function of the state of motion.
Many works of the past where authors have ingeniously exploited the law of the lever,
properties of equilibrium on the inclined plane, the principle of virtual displacements along
with the original, synthetic, formulation of Euclidean geometry illustrate that the technique
of thought experiments had long been the only tool for the accurate theoretical analysis until
the sophisticated algebra and calculus formalism was properly developed. Moreover, since
in Euclid’s Elements there are proofs that make use of such ”thought experiments” as rigid
motion of geometrical figures, even that work appears to be more related to the theoretical
physics (of shapes of solids) rather than to pure mathematics.
The successful use (along with the further development) of calculus in celestial mechanics
and continuum mechanics during the 18th and 19th centuries led researchers to its overval-
uation and to the perception of reasoning in the form of thought experiments and by means
of synthetic geometry as cumbersome. The thought that more complicated argumentation
may stem from weaker (i.e. less restrictive) premises was of little value for direct engineering
applications. Meanwhile, in search for foundations of geometry, algebra, and calculus, math-
ematicians of 19th and 20th centuries had developed some toolsets of the low-level analysis
such as the set theory and the category theory. However, physics theorists of that time were
not prepared to resort to so subtle but abstract tools because they saw no profit in refining
the non-numerical description of physical phenomena. Instead, the presentations of New-
tonian mechanics as an application of algebra and calculus became dominant in teaching.
As a result, invoking thought experiments in the physics literature since the mid-20th cen-
tury faded into preliminary heuristic reasoning or even mere interpretation of calculus-based
calculations. Only a few authoritative physicists have kept the tradition and addressed old
known thought experiments as well as invented new ones in their educational activity. The
inference of the existence of the gravitational energy of a body (along with the derivation
of the well known formula for it) from the impossibility of a perpetual motion machine40 is
one of the quite convincing examples of this kind. Still, such cases in point have been too
isolated to make a science-based logical structure able to replace the academic construct
of mechanics. The apparent cause for this is that non-numerical reasoning in physics is
commonly perceived as insufficiently rigorous.
The deductive presentation of Newtonian mechanics established in teaching practice has
become a model for the theoretical formulations of all other branches of physics. However,
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in case of theories of modern physics, such as quantum mechanics and general relativity, the
results of this approach appeared shocking for experimenters, since these theories use the
quantities that have names familiar from classical physics but not quite the same meaning.
While trying to perceive this fact, P. W. Bridgman came up with the idea to define a physical
quantity with an aid of operations used in its measurement (see p. 5 and p. 12 in Ref. 44).
Though provisional and theoretically naive, this idea can also be regarded as an attempt
to fill the logical gaps arisen at the foundation of the theory due to downgrading thought
experiments.
In the next section the reader will learn of those pre-numeric concepts which cannot be
avoided in the rigorous introduction of a basic physical quantity within the process of linking
empirical data.
V. WHAT COMPOSE A BASIC PHYSICAL QUANTITY?
Any teacher concerned with instilling the right attitude toward mathematics among
physics students has at least the following thought to convey to them: In contrast to such
numbers as, for example, the Mohs hardness of solids or the Mercalli intensity of earth-
quakes, those present in the mathematical expressions of laws of Nature have no option to
be defined arbitrarily or by convention. While the former, termed ordinals in mathematics
but often referred to as ranks or ranking numbers, are nothing but the labels for linearly
ordered data selected by human beings from observatins/experiments, the latter, termed car-
dinals in mathematics but usually referred to as quantities, constitute the set that natural
regularities enable researchers to equip with algebra operations.
It is well known that in physics, aside the dimensionless numbers, we are allowed to add
together only quantities of the same kind. Some of the addition operations, such as those
applied to the masses of joined bodies, the forces of combined actions, or the consecutive
displacements of a body, represent the basic physical regularities and reveal so distinctive
features of the quantities involved that these operations can be called addition rules for
these quantities. The necessary part of each addition rule is the non-numerical description
of the experimental/observational relation between the physical objects/processes whose
numerical magnitudes make the summands and the sum in the addition rule’s formula. It
seems reasonable to refer to this description as the composition.
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For example, in geometry l(AC) = l(AB) + l(BC) is the formula of the addition rule for
the length l(MN) of an oriented line segment MN while the composition specifies that the
union of the adjacent segments AB and BC of the same straight line is the segment AC.
Since a translation applied to one of two non-adjacent segments of a straight line can always
transform them into two adjacent segments, it extends the concept of the composition to
any two segments of a straight line.
Aiming to facilitate the process of accumulating new data in physics and engineering the
university mathematics courses usually present geometry with the aid of Cartesian coordi-
nates, which provides the description of translations of a point object as shift transformations
of its coordinates. Within the process of linking the empirical patterns of spatial arrange-
ments of physical bodies into explicit and implicit postulates of synthetic geometry, the
translational movement of a body is a basic concept which logically precedes and begets
those of body’s dimensions and coordinates. To illustrate this point, we need go further and
convert the notions in the above geometrical example, relating to segments of one straight
line, into the almost physical ones.
Studying the set of all segments of a given straight line experimentally on a sheet of
paper, a reseacher/learner can exploit some tools – such as a ruler and a compass – in
order ”to move” (i.e. to copy and put) any segment in any direction/place. But in contrast
to the common courses on synthetic geometry, physicists cannot state in advance that the
motions applied to the construction tools and/or to the segments themselves as physical
bodies are ”rigid.” And, naturally, in a fully consistent analysis, physicists cannot postulate
the existence of any unlimitedly fine instruments. Instead, their only research technique is
to formulate some hypothetical conditions and then to verify experimentally whether they
are satisfied or not by the available methods for setting the real physical bodies in motion.
Though the terms and notations in the initial example, such as the points A,B,C, no
doubt sound familiar to the reader, it is not good practice in the theoretical analysis to invoke
more notions than necessary. For this reason, below in this section not geometric points but
line segments themselves are considered to be basic objects. Ultimately, the right choice
of the basic/primitive notions in a given theoretical construction facilitates the expansion
of this construction, which is usually made by setting new basics/primitives and turning
the old ones into the derived notions. In physics, any successful theory is strongly (though
not always explicitly stated as) coupled with the class of feasible experiments or observable
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phenomena it describes. In particular, for many practical and research purposes, we can
associate Euclidean geometry with the variety of possible mutual arrangements of sufficiently
rigid macroscopic bodies. This also includes drawings on a sheet of paper, which serve so well
for the purposes of teaching. By convention, the other types of experimental/observational
data, such as those on relative motions of the bodies as well as on the properties of their
materials, let alone electromagnetic/optic phenomena, are just the subjects of physics itself.
Note that before any attempts of studying the real physical world a researcher or a learner
faces only the raw data, i.e. the set of unclassified, unstructured, unrelated things and events.
The reader can assume that the most coarse classification of such data simply corresponds to
one or another historical division of science into its branches; only the ability to distinguish
between geometric and non-geometric facts to some extent is important below. (This data
classification is a starting point of the inference designed to provide further specification.
Similar to an initial guess in the iterative computation method, it is allowed to be somewhat
arbitrary.) The rest of the section illustrates how a physicist could (and should) make
geometrical data linked, up to defining the length of a segment as a physical quantity.
To begin the process of building the desired mathematical structure, we should start to
refer to two bodies as geometrically equal/coinciding if they are indistinguishable without
addressing their non-geometric properties. The following definition extends the concept of
the geometric equality to two segments at different places. Two segments a and b of the
straight line can be called congruent, a ≅ b, if
1. a longitudinal motion of either a or b along the straight line juxtaposes them so that
they appear equal;
2. this relation is symmetric, i.e.
a ≅ b implies b ≅ a (3)
for any two segments a and b, and transitive, i.e.
a ≅ b and b ≅ c imply a ≅ c (4)
for any three segments a, b, and c.
If one changes the original relation ’being congruent’ into ’being either the same segment
or congruent’, one finds this modified version automatically symmetric and transitive and,
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additionally, reflexive, i.e.
a ≅ a. (5)
In mathematics, such a binary relation defined between any two elements of a given set is
called an equivalence relation (in this set).41 In physics, it is reasonable to apply this term
also to a relation defined between any two different elements of that set and satisfying only
(3) and (4) since the trivial modification, described above, automatically extends it up to
that compliant with the standard formulation.
The entities being in a given equivalence relation are generally referred to as equivalent
(with respect to that relation). The equivalence relation in a given set determines a partition
of that set into its pairwise disjoint subsets containing only equivalent elements and usually
referred to as equivalence classes of that set.42 More specific terms are possible for each
specific equivalence relation. For example, we can say that the congruence relation begets
the congruence classes.
The requirement that congruence is an equivalence relation imposes restrictions on the
possible uncertainty associated with the notion of line segment but can not eliminate it
completely. Most of the readers have no doubt been taught to describe the uncertainty
in observable physical events or in measurable physical regularities only by means of an
absolute error (along with its statistical estimation known as standard deviation) and a
relative error, which both eventually refer to some values of the physical quantity relevant
to the phenomenon under study. Historically, the concept of absolute error gave birth
to the fundamental construct of real analysis, the converging sequence of real numbers,
since such a list can be conceived as the abstraction of successive approximations of some
quantity in attempt to make their absolute error less than a given value. However, when
a researcher explores natural phenomena at the level that can not support the existence of
physical quantities as real numbers, the above familiar tools for monitoring the accuracy
of the experimental and/or theoretical investigation are not applicable. Since this essay
deliberately focuses on that level, the following comment about the more general description
of accuracy will be helpful.
To make things easier, one can limit the consideration to the set of all segments within
a given finite segment of the straight line, below referred to as the base segment. Then
the uncertainty in the congruence relation manifests itself in the finite number r of the
congruence classes in that set. Clearly, all sufficiently small segments have to make one
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class. Some larger segments make next class and so on. We can call r the congruence
resolution (in the base segment). An increase in this number is the sign of improving the
accuracy of congruence: The change r → r′ = r + 1 means that a researcher succeeds
in discerning more congruence classes. Note that only the difference of two resolutions is
essential while the actual value of r itself need not even be observable, especially in case of a
sufficiently large base segment. Also, it is important to understand that at this stage there
is no way to compare the accuracy improvements r1 → r
′
1
= r1 +1 and r2 → r
′
2
= r2 +1 for
r1 6= r2 since no characterization for the ”size” of a congruence class has been introduced yet.
This means that, though by definition r is a natural number, when describing the accuracy
it represents only an ordinal number.
The concept of congruence makes movable segments of a straight line similar to rigid
physical bodies. The concatenation a∪b of two segments a and b as their composition seems
compatible with this picture. Still, there remains to be regularities to establish/verify on
the way to the concept of length. For example, one should make sure that for each segment
a there is such a quantity l(a) that
l(a) + l(b) ≡ l(a ∪ b) = l(b ∪ a) ≡ l(b) + l(a). (6)
Someone with an engineering background may wonder: ”When I close the jaws of the slide
caliper around a mechanical part of interest and count, say, 7 contiguous spacings of 1 mm
in the caliper’s graduation from its origin mark to the pointer’s position, doesn’t it mean
that there is a dimension of this part which is congruent to the composition of 7 standard
line segments we simply agree to call ’millimeter’? If it does, then don’t the equalities like
3 mm + 4 mm = 4 mm + 3 mm follow from nothing but the axioms (i.e. the definitional
description) of natural numbers and simply mean that I can count any objects in any order
and so there is no need to check Eq. (6)?”
In response to these questions, an experienced theorist could explain: ”The dimension of
a macroscopic object in a given direction does exist with accuracy sufficient for engineering
applications, though not due to an act of measurement but due to a number of physical
regularities that govern the behavior of macroscopic solid bodies and, for this reason, underlie
various procedures of measuring length. Even if we are able to recognize what segments are
congruent, Eq. (6) still needs to be checked experimentally since it hinges on another notion,
a composition of two segments. Physically, this notion denotes the result of fastening one
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body to another so that the joined bodies can be set in motion without breaking their
bond. The idea that the composition has its origin in the real physical interaction entails
some reservations about this notion and, therefore, limits its application area. For example,
when one attaches a body a to a body b, one expects that such an act makes no effect on
the spatial extent of both a and b. However, this presumption may practically turn out
to be questionable for either measuring unusually small microscopic distances with usual
accuracy or measuring usual macroscopic dimensions with unusually high accuracy. In
other words, a researcher should be prepared to find no sufficiently rigid body that he/she
could call ’nanometer’. Then the ability of physics to maintain the concept of length, i.e.
the statements like Eq. (6), doesn’t look so trivial.”
Thus, the necessary logical step toward the definition of length is to state explicitly that
any a ≅ a1 and b ≅ b1 entail a∪ b ≅ a1 ∪ b1 where the symbol ∪ denotes contact interaction
between the end of one segment and the end of another segment. As soon as this statement is
experimentally verified one can use a∪b and a1∪b1 interchangeably to simplify the notation
of more complex congruence relations.
Then one should make sure that the relations
a ∪ b ≅ b ∪ a (7)
and
(a ∪ b) ∪ c ≅ a ∪ (b ∪ c) (8)
are realizable physically within a given resolution for any three segments a, b and c. Here
a pair of brackets is used to tag a composition treated as one segment in the sense of all
previous statements. Note that fact that the relation (7) itself entails the congruence of
some compositions of more than two segments, e.g. (a∪ b)∪ c ≅ c∪ (b∪a) while the relation
(8) is an independent statement.
As far as the above conditions are met, one can think of the line segments as rigid rods.
In particular, the relations (7) and (8) enable us to use the abbreviated (and more evocative)
notation na for the composition of n segments each congruent to a given segment a because
the order of the segments does not matter now. If na ≅ mb with a pair of natural numbers
n and m then it defines the ratio
R(a|b) = m/n. (9)
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Evidently, the rational number l(a) ≡ R(a|s) is simply what we agree to call the length of
the segment a when accepting s as a standard segment.
This section exploits the line segments to show how the concepts of equivalence relation
and composition can lead to the existence of a physical quantity, the length of a segment.
However, since any hint of the physical definition of a straight line is beyond the scope of
this essay, a line segment here is only a toy example of a physical object. The next section
outlines the pre-numeric introduction of a well known quantity applicable to the real physical
bodies.
VI. WHICH CAME FIRST, THE WEIGHT OR THE BALANCE?
Section II makes it clear that the presentation in common textbooks as well as, in-
evitably, in their respective courses hinges on a huge logical leap from the everyday notions
to the vaguely defined abstract concepts, rendered meaningful only by subsequent exam-
ples. In view of this practice, it would be no surprise to hear from a university graduate in
physics/engineering that to design, to assemble and then to adjust a beam balance requires
the prerequisite theoretical knowledge such as geometry, the concepts of the mass and the
weight, the lever principle and perhaps even the elasticity/plasticity theory to bring the
measurement errors under control as completely as possible.
However, there are hardly any doubts that there were no theoretical concepts involved in
the invention of such an ancient device. It is the direct juxtaposition of raw experimental
data that any experimenter has recourse to when the theory relevant to his research is yet to
be developed. Along the way to the discovery of the mass as a quantity, these preliminary
observations may have been carried out over a bar that has one hinge as a pivot and two
hinges to hold weights. The simple comparison of data obtained with different bars must
have led observant people to the conclusion that a certain group of such bars can exhibit a
consistent behavior: for any pair of weights (within the scope of the bars’ sensitivity; see
below), balancing each other on one bar implies doing so on any other bar. Then each bar
of that group became acceptable as a device named a balance. Naturally, the bar-like shape
is not essential for a device to be a balance. Even sophisticated intelligent system will do as
long as its use results in the same relation between weights as that of other balances. But
there must be at least several reference balances as simple as identifiable chunks of solid
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matter. Pivot’s motion and orientation may have an effect on the balance, yet adhering
to the consistent observations is enough for a researcher/learner to recognize and avoid
incorrect use of the balance.57 This consistency makes the relations between weights, further
described later on in this section, independent of the choice of a balance within some group
of such devices.
At this early stage of the theoretical development there would not yet have been any
numbers to characterize each equilibrium state of a balance loaded with weights. So a
researcher would have no choice but to mark each of the bodies under consideration and
then simply classify (the relations between) them. This would apply to all aspects of such
a study, including the description of accuracy. In particular, for each equilibrium state of a
balance there could be some groups of sufficiently light bodies the addition of which to one
of the balance’s scalepan don’t affect the equilibrium due to friction at the fulcrum. Then,
for want of better way to characterize the sensitivity of a given balance, the researcher would
have to enlist bodies that make up each of those groups.
Section V shows how comparison and composition properties give rise to the existence of
a physical quantity. It is not difficult to see that placing two bodies in the opposite scales
of a balance and then observing its final state is just a comparison procedure analogous
to juxtaposing two line segments. So this procedure applied to each pair of bodies from a
set of physical bodies results in the ordering of this set. In an analogy to the concept of
congruence, the researcher/learner can use the balance to verify that the binary relation
of ’being equiponderant’, hereinafter denoted as ”≅,” is an equivalence relation in a set of
physical bodies and therefore partitions this set into the classes of equiponderant bodies.
It is worthwhile to keep in mind that in this context finding a real body equiponderant
to a given body relies on trial and error, which is the most basic technique available to
researchers.
The equiponderance relation makes it possible to introduce the equiponderance resolution.
The definition for this simplest structured characterization of the accuracy of equilibrium
within a given set of bodies is similar to the congruence resolution in the geometry of
line segments (see p.16 in Section V). In the practice of weighing macroscopic bodies the
uncertainty in equilibrium is almost entirely due to the limited sensitivity of a balance.
(Since, by definition, a balance belongs to a group of mutually consistent devices, one can
also say that all the devices in the group share the same sensitivity.) Because of this, the
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concept of the equiponderance resolution can be directly demonstrated by a teacher in the
classroom or experienced by students in their lab activity. To do so, they should choose a
certain amount of sand (or other easily divisible substance) and then make all those pairs
of equiponderant portions of the sand that are distinguishable from each other with an aid
of a given balance. Specifically, they can start with equipoise of the two halves of the initial
amount of the sand on the two pans of the balance, below referred to as the pan 1 and the pan
2. The experimenters should make sure that removing sand from the pan 1 does not disturb
the balance until the amount of the removed sand does not exceed a certain threshold. Then
the various amounts of the remaining sand in the pan 1 that can keep equilibrium with the
untouched sand in the pan 2 make the first equiponderance class. As soon as the gradual
removal of sand in the pan 1 starts breaking equilibrium, the experimenters should swap the
roles of the pan 1 and the pan 2. Then the varied amount of sand in the pan 2 that can keep
equilibrium with the fixed amount of sand in the pan 1 represents the second equiponderance
class. If one repeats these procedures until the exhaustion of sand in the pans, one finds
the total number of the equiponderance classes, i.e. the equiponderance resolution of the
balance with respect to the initial amount of sand.
Besides heaps of sand, there are other bodies whose heavinesses one can compare with
a given balance. Naturally, the complete equiponderance classes of the balance are limited
by its strength and dimensions. If an equiponderance class does include heaps of sand, the
spread of the sand amounts in the heaps is a distinguishing characteristic for the whole class.
So the ”sand” equiponderance resolution, described above, is a simple gauge of uncertainty
of the equiponderance, which logically precedes both the notion of composition of several
bodies and the ensuing concept of mass/weight.
As the reader can see in Section V, the necessary step toward the definition of a basic
physical quantity is to verify that the equivalence of two compositions follows the equivalence
relations between their respective components. But whereas a line segment, the model
presented in Section V, has only two ends where other segments of the same line can join
to form another segment58, the surface of a real solid has numerous sites where one can
attach other solids to make a compound stable within a given class of its motions. So the
reseacher/learner interested in the fully consistent introduction of the mass/weight should
make sure that any a ≅ a1 and any b ≅ b1 together entail a∪i b ≅ a1∪j b1 for any two bonds
∪i and ∪j between two bodies a and b and between their counterparts a1 and b1. Such a
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statement implies that a∪ib ≅ a∪jb. It makes all bonds between two given bodies equivalent,
so one can use the symbol ∪ to denote the presence of a bond without specifying its type.
Under the current meaning of all the symbols as they are used in this section, the relation
(7) holds automatically while the relation (8) does need verifying. It is after completing this
verification (for a given set of bodies and for a given equiponderance resolution), one can
assert the existence of the rational numbers (9) and then define the mass m[a] ≡ R(a|s) of
a body a with the aid of a standard body s. Here a ’standard body’ means a reference body
that represents only itself. Meanwhile, nothing prevents us from adapting a reference body
to represent a standard action, for instance, a certain extension/contraction of a certain
spring loaded by this reference body. If this is done under the same conditions in which
one uses the balance to weigh a given body, then weighing will actually yield the quantity
conventionally called the (apparent) weight of this body.59
Those who apprehend the logic of presentation in this and previous section may guess
how one could further proceed with introducing basic physical quantities: For instance,
the consistency of balances, outlined in the beginning of this section, can be described
accurately in terms of an equivalence relation between two balances. By combining it with
some rules for the composition of balances one can eventually come to another well known
quantity. The same applies to the bonds between parts of solid and further concepts that
a researcher/learner would inevitably refine while getting increasingly detailed description
of interactions between macroscopic bodies. However, the space limitations for a journal
publication does not allow this essay to extend that far. Instead, in the next and final
section the reader can find some suggestions of how teachers can take advantage of the
logically consistent presentation of basic physical quantities.
VII. WHAT IS THE BENEFIT?
The main concern of this essay is to show how and why the pre-numeric concepts such as
an equivalence relation between and a composition of physical entities give rise to a numeric
characterization of these entities. This is exemplified by the logical chain of introducing
the mass/weight of a physical body. Quite naturally, to deliver this presentation verbatim
in the classroom can hardly help a teacher to fulfil the traditional objectives of physics
classes, especially those for non-physics majors. Nevertheless, the mere existence of the
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properly ordered hierarchy of the basic physical concepts can immediately benefit at least
the following three groups of teachers:
The teachers from the first group are young instructors that claim no significant expertise
in curriculum development but feel obliged to be representatives of science in the classroom.
They would like to help their students in getting knowledge from standard textbooks, yet
it irks them to take responsibility for the textbooks’ logic. Evidently, it is unlikely that
the students would be able to question this logic by themselves. However, the slipshod
treatment of the fundamentals, such as outlined in sections I-III, is the very deficiency in the
standard texts that inclines the increasing number of unqualified people to perceive physical
theories on par with pseudo-scientific arbitrary constructs. As a result, there are many web
forums, blogs and other sites where they comment on various aspect of science presented in
education and in public media. This makes it possible for an unexperienced teacher to face
the embarrassing questions, which he/she cannot ignore without losing his/her credibility
in the classroom. Now, in response to questioning the mandatory texts, he/she can soundly
explain that there is a technique to introduce the basic concepts seamlessly from experiments
if need be but it goes beyond the current curriculum.
The second group consists of the teachers that have enough experience to understand
that real physics is an experiment-based science, which can adopt theory only to the extent
justified by experimentally driven problems. So they never see solid reasons to worry about
such thing as the poor presentation of theoretical notions. Still, they probably favor those
minor changes in physics courses that would make experimentation more proactive in ex-
pounding fundamentals rather than focused on the passive choice between several externally
devised hypotheses. The technique outlined in this essay just shows how to organize the
initial trial and error process of discovering physical regularities within the most rational,
purely phenomenological approach.
The teachers/lecturers from the third group are supposed to be both theoretically-minded
and bold/authoritative enough to update the physics curriculum. They can take advantage
of the pre-numerical level of theoretical description, such as one used in Section VI or more
elaborated, to rebuild the beginning of their physics course in a theoretically impeccable
manner. Obviously, the curricula for physics majors need to be changed first. But even as
early as in the middle school science lessons, it would also seem natural to address some of the
pre-numerical notions as a first acquaintance with the theory underlying the measurement
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procedures, instead of premature introduction to the algebra-based concepts of Newtonian
mechanics.
Successful integration of the pre-numerical formalism into physics curricula for the intro-
duction of even one physical quantity will turn it into a model for a theoretically consistent
and experimentally well-grounded presentation, which will then stimulate improving other
topics in the curricula and developing higher standards for the explication of physical phe-
nomena in both educational and research activities.
Appendix A: Do you know how to subtract?
To get the point of the heading across to a person with the middle school level of education
I recommend him to assess the validity of using the minus (subtraction) sign ”−” in the
following entries:
15 pigs − 10 ducks, (A1)
10 inches in length − 2 inches in width, (A2)
5 meters ahead at 3rd second
− 2 meters left at 1st second. (A3)
I then ask the student to interpret/impove these expressions to make them meaningful.
”What a nonsense! If someone has nothing but fifteen pigs at his disposal how could he
find among them ten ducks to remove? Anyway, I was taught you cannot add quantities of
different kinds together, nor subtract one from another.” This would be a likely response to
the entry (A1). And I would make the following comment to it: ”You were taught about
using arithmetics quit correctly. But perhaps that wouldn’t be the first thing that came to
your mind if I drew your attention to the similar entry ’10 pigs + 3 ducks .’ Apparently,
this is because there is no problem to put three ducks among ten pigs for the time being.
After some thought, you will be able to come up with a more or less plausible interpretation
of the entry (A1), too. Say, it might be a note of a farm owner where the shorthand
’−’ indicates a debt to his fellow farmer. One could also imagine that those animals are
actually waxworks, so that the entry (A1) might involve melting some of the figures of pigs
to cast the figures of ducks from the resulting wax. Note that the subtraction rule in this
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last example necessarily includes the knowledge about the nature of the objects to which
it applies. The same holds for the basic physical quantities in a standard introductory
physics course, because all relevant addition and subtraction operations are possible only in
accordance with the formulas that express the physical laws relating such quantities.”
This preliminary discussion encourages the student to get more careful and to suspect
that the entry (A2) and maybe even the entry (A3) need improvement since, at least for-
mally, both look as if the subtraction is applied to the quantities of different types. Now,
interpreting the entry (A2), the student will be able to come to the idea that somebody cuts
a square from one end of a paper strip 10 inches long and 2 inches wide. Then the student’s
corrected version of that entry will probably look like
10 inches in length − 2 inches in length obtained
by rotation from 2 inches in width
Thinking about the entry (A3) in its turn, the student will guess that the moments of time,
which seem additionally labeling everything, are a characterization of an external construct
named a reference frame whose construction/motion may affect the result of the subtraction
in the entry (A3).
Appendix B: Do we know our limits?
In accordance with the factual empirical basis of Newton’s laws, one should provisionally
define classical mechanics as a theoretical description of interactions and relative motions of
(the parts of) macroscopic bodies. Aside from such regularities as Hooke’s law or Newton’s
law of universal gravitation, the theory should necessarily include Euclidean geometry as a
description of the properties of the potentially possible arrangements of rigid solids.
Due to the inevitably limited accuracy of their empirical sources, the various components
of the theory are not compatible entirely. This essay is not the place to analyze the logical
structure of classical mechanics in detail and to evaluate the degree of its inconsistencies in
the usual form of the relative error dependent on parameters of a particular problem. Still,
there are situations where an initial assumption of the theory fails apparently, so it is not
difficult to estimate the marginal value of a parameter for which the relative error of the
theory is of the order of unity. Below the reader can see how to find out the lower bound a
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of the spatial scales (or, equivalently, the size of a part of a macroscopical body) over which
classical theory is applicable.
The important thing that classical mechanics implies about a macroscopic body is that its
material is able to convey the external force from its one part to another. Newton employed
this empirical fact in his Principia to prove his third Law of motion for the long-range
interaction (see p. 10 in Section III of this essay.). Meanwhile, it is common engineering
knowledge that any material can withstand a tensile or compressive stress that does not
exceed a certain value called the strength of the material. Although fewer imperfections in
the crystal structure of solid or less impurities in liquid entail its higher strength, each such
quantity ultimately appears to be finite and thereby sets a limit for Newtonian mechanics.
For teaching/analyzing this limitation of classical mechanics the most simple relevant
experimental data available are on the cavitation in liquids stretched by a negative pressure
−p. In other words, a teacher/theorist who gives due attention to the process of linking
empirical data (see p. 9 of this essay) has little choice but to turn to what makes such liquid
unstable: a spherical cavity that can grow. If the surface tension of the liquid is σ, then the
minimal radius of such cavity,
a ≈
2σ
p
, (B1)
follows from the hydrostatic equilibrium condition (see, e.g., Eq. (1.15) at p. 12 in Ref. 62
where the vapor pressure p′′ can be neglected). In the following, it is assumed that p has
reached its bound, i.e. equals the tensile strength of the liquid. Then Eq. (B1) also tells us
about the maximal radius of a cavity arising spontaneously in the stretched liquid. And for
the sake of consistency, in pure liquid, we should ascribe the origin of such an initial cavity
to deviations from the classical laws. Thus a turns out to be an estimation for the desired
marginal size.
Someone may object that the above reasoning relies on an extrapolation of classical me-
chanics (specifically, hydrostatics) laws to the spatial scale where they are not supposed
to be applicable. In fact, this extrapolation is a part of the definition of the marginal
spatial scale a, at which classical and non-classical effects are expected to be of the same
order of magnitude. To make the reasoning formally compatible with non-classical contribu-
tion/modification one should simply use the symbol ”≃” in Eq. (B1) in place of the symbol
”≈.” Note that this enables us to refer to the estimation based on Eq. (B1) as empirical,
i.e. as true as the input empirical data.
25
For water p ≃ 30 MPa and σ ≈ 70 mN/m at the temperature about 20◦C (see p. 4 in
Ref. 64 or p. 041603-17 in Ref. 63) so one can find a ≃ 5 nm. The dynamical timescale
τ ≃ 2a/cs ≈ 7 ps of the corresponding disturbances (where cs ≈ 1.5 km/s is the speed of
sound in water) is a more informative characteristic of the cohesive interaction between parts
of water. In particular, the interactions governing the spontaneous density fluctuations and
the dissipation of the externally induced waves are the same, and so are their characteristic
timescales, because something we treat classically as growing and collapsing bubbles under-
lies both the phenomena. Note that the relaxation time τ ≈ 8ps actually manifests itself in
water (see p. 197802-2 in Ref. 69).
Data relating to liquid helium allow us to estimate a as the temperature approaches 0 K:
The 3He tensile strength 3 bar (see p. S79 in Ref. 65 and p. 64064507-1 in Ref. 66) along
with its surface tension 160 mdyn/cm (see p. 291 in Ref. 67) and the 4He tensile strength
9 bar (see p. S76 in Ref. 65 and p. 64064507-1 in Ref. 66) along with its surface tension
375µJ/m2 (see p. 565 in Ref. 68) yield a ≃ 1 nm for both 3He and 4He. Note that all the
values of a far exceed a characteristic atomic spacing, the Bohr radius 0.053 nm.
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